Le Pen Pushers by Rechniewski, Elizabeth
FEATURES 41
LePen
PUSHERS
The rise o f the French far right in the 80s sparked anxiety 
across Europe. Elizabeth Rechniewski contends that the 
Left's postmodern turn may have been partly to blame. 
She argues that the western Left needs to return to its 
older belief in universal human values.
he rise of the Front National in 
France in the mid-1980s transformed 
the previously settled terrain of 
French party politics. It also led to a 
somewhat uneven debate on the reasons for its 
success and the best means of combating i t  The 
role of the media in giving its leader Jean-Marie 
Le Pen a platform has been widely criticised, as 
has been their tendency to sensationalise inci­
dents in the housing estates on the outskirts of 
the cities, where many families of immigrant 
origin live.
Of course, neither a more sophisticated level of debate in 
the media nor the sporadic concerts and demonstrations 
of anti-racist organisations such as SOS Radsme (which 
neVer had deep roots among the young of the 'cit£s' them­
selves) have solved the multiple problems of the housing 
estates. This would require an investment far beyond any­
thing the governments of prime ministers Michel Rocard 
or Edith Cresson have been able or willing to spend. Nor 
have they succeeded in seizing the political initiative from 
the Front National and its leader Le Pen which has increas­
ingly set the agenda of the debate for the traditional Right 
and centre-Right parties. Already ideologically adrift and 
bitterly divided over issues such as European integration, 
these parties are particularly susceptible to the blandish­
ments of Le Pen, since they cannot on their own expect to 
win enough votes to form a stable majority in parliament. 
With the centre ground fairly comprehensively colonised 
by the Socialists since the early 1980s, the Right and centre- 
Right parties feel they must capture some of Le Pen's 
constituency by taking on board just as much of his anti­
immigrant ballast as will not offend the more liberal mem­
bers of the alliance.
Thus, both Jacques Chirac, leader of the gaullist RPR, and 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, leader of the conservative 
UDF—both probable contenders for the presidency in the 
elections of 1995—have allowed some of L« Pen's language 
to creep into their speech in the last year or two: 'slips'
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which can be modified or qualified later but which suggest 
to Le Pen's audience that their views are not overlooked.
It is a common mistake to believe that the Front National 
is a single issue party obsessed with the alien Arab 
minority, a response to the increasing immigrant presence. 
This is to overlook the fact that the FN has an all-encom- 
passing political philosophy with deep roots in French 
history. It reflects a current of thought that comes to the 
surface at a time not merely of social and economic crisis, 
but when the very identity of the French nation seems to 
be in question, as is now the case with the extension of the 
European Community. (The Front National is a fervent 
opponent of the Maastricht Treaty.) It is an ideology that 
has been carried by different groups over the years, the 
most recent incarnation being the Poujade movement of 
the 1950s—a movement of small shopkeepers opposed to 
the rapid modernisation of France's commerce and in­
dustry. Le Pen first entered the French parliament as a 
Poujade deputy.
There are many other links with the past to be found in 
both the ideology and the personnel of the Front National. 
A number of its founder members were involved in the 
far-rightwing leagues of the 1930s and in Vichy France. Its 
ideological roots go back much further though, to the 
late-19th century, the period of Drumont's bestseller, La 
France Juive (Jewish France) and of the Dreyfus affair. It is 
only by going back to this tradition that one can under­
stand why the FN is so strongly anti-semitic—seemingly a 
rather strange posture to adopt when in the present climate 
they have more to gain from being anti-Arab. The memory 
of World War Two is still too strong to allow most people 
to give themselves over wholeheartedly to anti-semitism. 
But Le Pen is merely respecting his 19th century roots. 
French theorists at that time were already articulating the 
thesis of the decadence of French civilisation—a key word 
in Le Pen's vocabulary—and the subversive influence on 
the French identity of foreigners, deviants, Jews and 
freemasons. All these targets the FN has also made its own.
Like its early 20th century predecessors, the FN is strongly 
nationalistic; highly critical of a 'corrupt' democracy, it 
aims for an authoritarian regime and a hierarchical society 
structured to combat 'decadence'. But in a number of im­
portant ways the 'Fifty concrete measures concerning 
immigration' proposed last November by the FN go fur­
ther, and recall measures taken by the Vichy government 
during the occupation of France in World War Two. The 
FN's policy of limiting jobs to French workers and dismiss­
ing immigrants before French workers, for example, finds 
a parallel in the Vichy laws limiting to 2% the number of 
Jews allowed to practise in certain professions (and ban­
ning them from others al together). Trawn'/, Famille, Patrie 
(Work, Family, Nation) has also been taken up unchanged 
by the FN. This slogan deliberately counters the republican 
motto: Liberty, Egalite, Fraternity, discarding the universal 
values that the revolutionary motto represents. The FN 
makes no bones about its opposition to the universalistic 
ideologies encapsulated in documents such as the Decla­
ration of the Rights of Man which—despite their apparent­
ly im p eccable French orig ins— are dism issed as 
'cosmopolitan' and anti-French.
However, there have also been certain changes in the 
ideological forms used by the FN which distinguished it 
from previous Right movements and which have made the 
debate between Left and Right more confusing and more 
complex. Pierre-Andr£ Taguieff, perhaps the most widely 
respected writer on racism in France, has described the 
move during the 1980s from one type of racism to another 
as part of a wider move by the Right to transform the 
parameters of political debate, by appropriating values 
adopted in the past by the Left and outdoing the Left in 
advocating them.
Racism in its major forms in the 19th and first half of the 
20th century relied on a pseudo-scientific demonstration 
of the inequality of races, founded on supposed genetic, 
biological and therefore immutable differences. It estab­
lished a hierarchy of human races, a ranking of inferior and 
superior which justified racist practices of exclusion and 
dominance. The opponents of this kind of racism had 
recourse to universalistic values: we are all equal, we have 
more in common than divides us. The battle lines were 
clear and the scientific consensus worked against the 
proponents of racism.
But in the 80s, according to Taguieff, developments have 
taken place on each side of the ideological barricade which 
have blurred the arguments and undercut somewhat the 
anti-racist stance. The far Right has found a way of refor­
mulating racist ideology to avoid the discredit cast on the 
earlier bases for discriminating, by moving away from 
claims of genetic/biological difference towards theories of 
cultural difference.
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The irony of this new turn, Taguieff suggests, is that the 
ground has been prepared in part by the Left and the 
anti-racists themselves. In the 80s they questioned the ideal 
of the nation 'united and indivisible', so long an essential 
aspect of their ideological tradition, and have put increas­
ing emphasis on the right to difference and respect for 
other cultures.
The Right have seized on this development and have 
turned it to their own ends. Yes, they agree, cultures are 
different and must be respected but, for this very reason, 
it is dangerous to bring them together, for this leads in­
evitably to a dilution of each culture and therefore to the 
loss of what is precious and unique. The old horror of the 
mixing of races reappears under a new guise. It is opposed 
because it will lead to irreparable loss of cultural difference 
resulting in an undifferentiated, characterless mass. When 
the FN argues against the presence of immigrants it claims, 
therefore, to be seeking to protect a unique culture— 
French civilisation—against a kind of genocide resulting 
from the presence of other cultures.
Moreover, the Right argues that it speaks, not only in the 
interests of its own culture, but also in the immigrants' own 
interest, because the immigrants' culture will also be ad­
versely affected by contact with another alien and inas- 
similable culture. Some cultures are considered close to 
one another of course, so Europeans can intermingle safely. 
But others are simply too different to be able to be brought 
together without risk.
In another ironic twist, the FN has clambered on board the 
ecology bandwagon, using arguments concerning the 
preservation of endangered species to support their argu­
ment for the preservation of endangered cultures! They 
call themselves not 'ecologistes' (for whom they express a 
great deal of contempt—they are to some extent rivals, 
since both compete for the votes of those who are disil­
lusioned with the major parties) but ‘ecologiens’. They are 
found of quoting Konrad Lorenz's view that nature con­
sists of a struggle between species. For species they sub­
stitute culture and add that just as many species are 
endangered in the world today so, even more importantly, 
are many cultures which must be protected by any right- 
thinking 'ecologien'.
The anti-racists, Taguieff argues, have not found a satisfac­
tory response to these ideological moves, for a number of 
reasons. First, the right to cultural difference is increasingly 
being claimed by minority groups in fundamentalist and 
separatist movements among immigrant groups themsel­
ves and among Jews. There is a demand among some for 
exclusively Muslim schools in France, while certain rabbis 
have attempted to re-emphasise the uniqueness of the Jews 
and the impossibility of separating religion and politics. In 
such situations the most unexpected and dangerous allian­
ces can take place.
Secondly, the ideological position of the Left has been 
Weakened by its questioning of the universalistic values 
embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, a ques­
tioning characteristic of French post-structuralist theory. If
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what Jean-Francis Lyotard describes in La Condition 
Postmodeme as the great universalising myths have died, 
if we cannot agree on common values which transcend 
each culture, enshrined in the equal rights and capacities 
of the individual, or if we cannot appeal to a reason com­
mon to all, then the grounds for a meeting of cultures are 
thin indeed.
Further problems are created by the Left's abandonment 
of the jacobin tradition of the strong central state imposing 
universalist principles and a national culture on an often 
unwilling population. The French school system—less 
highly centralised than in the past—now plays a less im­
portant unifying role. The state is increasingly reduced to 
being a mere facilitator of economic progress as a result of 
the acceptance by the Socialist government in France of the 
need to open up the economy to market forces. The decline 
of the state has opened the way to the ideology of the 
nation.
Racism is not, of course, merely a result of ideological 
adroitness, the ability to cobble together a convincing ar­
gument and spread it effectively. The principal reason that 
the Front has met with some success are the underlying 
social, economic, political and psychological crises that 
beset the French today. Moreover, the FN has shown an 
ability (which has not been typical of other European 
far-right parties) to unify under the same banner different 
groups including Catholic fundamentalists, revisionist 
historians and dissatisfied police unions. Their increasing­
ly populist stand on economic issues which directly con­
tradicts their earlier Reaganite position against state 
intervention in the labour market, makes them even more 
attractive to former communist voters. To combat the 
ideology of the Front is first and foremost to combat the 
conditions that make it possible; among them the effective 
ghettoisation of immigrant groups in the 'cites' and ex­
tremely high unemployment, particularly among young 
people.
However, Taguieff contends that to counter the Right's 
manoeuvrings it might also be necessary to return to some 
kind of universalist stance. This might require arguing that 
the preservation of cultural difference is not the only value 
to be promoted in the meeting of groups. And this would, 
in turn, involve questioning the acceptance of the cultural 
relativism that has become an axiom of much recent leftw- 
ing thought. How far can respect for cultural difference go?
In the name of cultural difference do we respect the rights 
of families to practise cliterodectomy, to take two wives, or 
to marry their daughters against their will? Hampered by 
a bad attack of historical bad conscience, terrified of ap­
pearing superior and therefore racist in the old definition 
of the term, not wanting to repeat the mistakes of past 
centuries of missionary intervention, the Left seems to 
have lost the will to judge and to fight for the rights of 
individuals when they conflict with those of 'culture'.
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